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Abstract
We present TrustDavis, an online reputation system that
provides insurance against trade fraud by leveraging exist-
ing relationships between players, such as the ones present
in existing social networks. Using TrustDavis and a sim-
ple strategy, an honest player can set an upper bound on
the losses caused by any malicious collusion of players. In
addition, TrustDavis incents participants to accurately rate
each other, resists participant's pseudonym changes, and is
inherently distributed.
1 Introduction
Some online auction sites have formalized the means by
which individuals provide feedback on buyers and sellers.
Loosely speaking, we call such mechanisms online reputa-
tion systems. A reputation system collects, distributes, and
aggregatesfeedback about participants' past behavior[13].
Examples are eBay's Feedback Forum1 and the feedback
ratings at overstock.com.
Such systems usually attribute a rating to a particular
identity. Ideally, individuals with good ratings are reliable
trade partners, whereas individualswith poor ratings should
be avoided2. Unfortunately, the reputation systems now
available on the internet can be manipulated by malicious
individuals or groups for selsh purposes. For example,
a group can collude to articially improve an individual's
ratings with the intent of tricking unsuspecting victims into
tradingwithsomeonethatwill neverdeliverthegoods. This
is the well known hit and run problem, to which all unse-
curedbilateralexchangeis susceptibleas thereis always the
temptation to receive a good or service without reciproca-
tion [10]. This problem is aggravated online as many trade
partners are veiled by relative anonymity and rarely trade.
1See the eBay website at www.ebay.com for a description of the Feed-
back Forum.
2Here we assume that past behavior is indicative of future behavior.
Mechanismsthat have beenproposedto mitigatesuch prob-
lems have achieved limited success [5, 1]. Ideally, we want
a reputation system that resists malicious manipulation by
groups of colluding parties, or at least that provides a strat-
egy that honest participants can use to limit their exposure
to such manipulation. TrustDavis has this property, as well
as three others, these properties are:
￿ Honest participants can limit the damage caused by
malicious collusions of dishonest participants.
￿ Malicious participants gain no signicant advantage
by changing or issuing themselves multiple identities.
￿ Thereis strongincentiveforparticipantsto provideac-
curate ratings of each other.
￿ It requiresno centralized services, and thus can be eas-
ily distributed.
To our knowledge, TrustDavis is the rst online reputation
system proposed that can provide hard limits on the risk
exposure of participants and combines these properties.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey
reviews of the current literature, focusing on motivating the
three properties not yet discussed in detail. Section 3 de-
scribes the basic framework of the system, the use of refer-
ences. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 obtain upper and lower bounds
on the price of references. Section 4 describes a strategy
that helps honest players avoid exploitation by malicious
ones. In section 5, we summarize our results and provide
suggestions for further research.
2 Related Work
An important difference between real world reputa-
tions and online reputations is that it may be possible to
shed a bad online reputation by simply changing one's on-
line pseudonym. This is a challenge that reputation systems
should address [13]. This cheap pseudonym characteris-
tic ofonline interactionimposesfundamentalconstraints onthe degree of cooperation that can be achieved and to how
well newcomers are treated by the community[6]. In Trust-
Davis, the ability to issue multiple identities or to change
identity does not provide a signicant advantage to a mali-
cious party, since a malicious party must back each identity
with funds that other players can use to protect their trans-
actions.
We see onlinereputationsystems andtrust inferencepro-
tocols as two sides of the same coin, since both mecha-
nisms deal with the trust transitivity problem. In both cases,
one must infer the reliability (trustworthiness) of an agent
based on one's own experience and the experience of oth-
ers. There have been quite a few proposals in the literature
that address the trust transitivity problem each with its own
set of desiderata [8, 7, 14, 16, 2].
Some proposals that address the trust transitivity prob-
lem allow each party arbitrary control over the ratings they
provide [7]. Thus, one individual may rate all of his ac-
quaintances as extremely reliable (trustworthy). This offers
exibility, but it may also allow malicious parties to trick
the system by rating other parties undeservedly well. Some
improvementon the qualityof the ratingscan be achieved
if individuals are not allowed to rate others arbitrarily. A
good example of such an approach is the EigenTrust trust
inferencealgorithmforpeer-to-peernetworks[8]. InEigen-
Trust there is a normalization step that implies that peers
onlyhave a limited amount of trust to assign to each of their
neighbors. In fact, one can argue that peers are only as-
signed a relative trust value in EigenTrust not an absolute
one3. We believe it is desirable to ensure honest reporting
of the past behavior of other participants as pointed out in
[13, 12]. In the system we propose, there is a strong incen-
tive for individuals to rate others accurately through refer-
ences, since they are liable for bad references.
Usually, one ofthe goals of havinga reputationsystem is
to elicit better behavior from participants by providing the
right incentives. It can be very useful in distributed systems
such as peer-to-peer networks to make systems incentive
compatible. For example, the free-rider problem can be
seen as incentive compatibility issue. Thus, it is desirable
to have a reputation system that can be distributed to enable
its deployment in distributed applications such as peer-to-
peernetworks. TrustDavis dependssolely on paths between
transacting parties and is as a result, inherently distributed.
3 The Model
We view agents or players as vertices in a graph
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. Initially, agents publish information about other
agents whom they know and trust, by publishing references
3Unfortunately, it is still possible to trick EigenTrust into attributing an
undeservedly high rating to an individual by obtaining multiple identities.
to them. Each reference is an acceptance of limited liabil-
ity. We expectexistingsocialrelationshipstoberepresented
after this initialization. Parents would give references to
their kids and spouses. Business partners would give refer-
ences to fellow workers, friends would provide references
to friends and so on. Individuals with no references can
join TrustDavis through the use of security deposits. They
would simply leave a deposit with a member of the net-
work that would then provide references to the newcomers.
The newcomers should choose a trustworthy member for
this task. This points out two issues:
￿ Parties assume liability (take risks) when they provide
referencesandthus referencesshouldbe providedonly
to trusted parties.
￿ There should be some incentive for parties to provide
references and take on risk. Thus, parties can function
as insurers and charge a premium for the references
they provide.
If player
￿ gives a reference to player
￿ in the value of
$100, then player
￿ would be willing to accept limited lia-
bility for bad trade caused by
￿ . In other words, if
￿ were
to default payment on a transaction,
￿ would be willing to
pay the creditor up to $100. Similarly, if
￿ failed to ship
a product,
￿ should be willing to reimburse the buyer for
payments already made up to the total of $100. We say that
￿ would be willing to accept liability because the reference
is only a statement of
￿ 's intent. Before
￿ accepts liability
she needs to check two things:
￿ Whether someone else is already using the reference
requested; and
￿ Who is asking for the reference.
This should be done in real-time (online) to avoid duplicate
usage of a single reference.
In our graph
￿
, there is a directed edge going from ver-
tex
￿
￿
￿ to vertex
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿ gives
￿
￿
￿ a reference. Each edge
is labeled by the value of the reference provided and each
edge label can be seen as the maximum ow capacity for
that edge. Note that a vertex controls the ow on all its
outbound edges by controlling the references it provides to
other parties.
If vertex
￿
￿
￿ wants to buy a product valued at $x dollars
from vertex
￿
￿
￿ then both vertices can complete the transac-
tionwithnorisk iftheaggregatenetworkowcapacityfrom
￿
￿ to
￿
￿
￿ and vice versa is of a value largerthan or equal to x.
To insure himself against bad behavior from vertex
￿
￿
￿ , the
buyer
￿
￿ obtains enough ow capacity to cover the value
of the transaction from each vertex in the paths from
￿
￿
￿ to
￿
￿ . Similarly, to insure the transaction with
￿
￿
￿ , the seller
￿
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Figure 1. A simple example network, edges
denote how much liability nodes are willing
to accept.
also obtains references from enough vertices so that the ag-
gregateowin theoppositedirection(i.e. from
￿
￿
￿ to
￿
￿ )is at
least equal to the value of the transaction. In a sense we are
going to reduce the trust transitivity problem to a network
ow problem.
Consider the situation depicted in Figure 1. Assume all
vertices are willing to provide references and furthermore
that claims are undisputed,i.e. always paid whenrequested.
In this scenario, vertex
￿
￿
￿ can purchase goods valued at up
to $150 from vertex
￿
￿ . To insure himself
￿
￿
￿ obtains:
￿ a reference valued at $100 from
￿
￿ against bad behav-
ior of
￿
￿ .
￿ a referencevalued at $50 from
￿
￿
￿ against bad behavior
of
￿
￿
￿ .
￿ a referencevalued at $50 from
￿
￿ against bad behavior
of
￿
￿ .
Similarly, to insure the transaction
￿
￿ should obtain:
￿ a reference valued at $150 from
￿
￿
￿ against bad behav-
ior of
￿
￿
￿ .
Once these references are obtained, the transaction can go
ahead and neither party will lose money if the other party
misbehaves.
If, for example,
￿
￿ does not deliver the service/product,
￿
￿ can simply obtain the $150 paid by contacting
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ .
If
￿
￿
￿ declines to pay then
￿
￿ can recover this loss by asking
￿
￿
￿ for a further $50. In the case that
￿
￿
￿ declines to pay the
$150 then
￿
￿ 's original assessment of providing a reference
for
￿
￿
￿ in the value of $150was incorrect and
￿
￿ should have
deposited sufcient funds upon
￿
￿ 's entry to the system to
cover this situation (see section 4.1).
Now, if parties are always willing to provide references
and claims are undisputed then
￿
￿
￿ can cheat by also asking
for a reference from
￿
￿ and later claiming that
￿
￿
￿ did not
deliver the product. This strategy can provide
￿
￿ with an
extra $50 at no cost. This problem will be addressed in
sections 3.3 and 4.3.
In section 3.1 below, we will describe TrustDavis from
the point of view of the purchaserand in section 3.2 we will
consider the same problem from the point of view of the
insurer.
3.1 Paying for References
Suppose that in order to provide an incentive, parties are
paid for the references they provide. We view this as each
party becoming an insurance broker who will sell a refer-
ence (or insurance) relating to a specic transaction. How
much should each party be paid for the references they pro-
vide?
First consider the situation where the reference is pro-
vided to a party that will under no circumstance make a
false claim and, thus, is ultimately trusted. For example,
￿
￿
￿ could be
￿
￿ 's mother. In this case,
￿
￿ can be certain that
if
￿
￿ makes a claim, then it was because
￿
￿
￿ did not deliver
the product as agreed. Although
￿
￿
￿ 's trust in
￿
￿ assures him
that he will not have to pay for false claims made by
￿
￿ he
has no guarantee that
￿
￿
￿ will fulll his end of the transac-
tion. Thus,
￿
￿
￿ is still taking some risk. If
￿
￿
￿ takes on this
riskandis notappropriatelyrewardedforit (as wouldbethe
case if
￿
￿
￿ were my mother!), a sequence of bad transactions
could eventually drive him bankrupt.
The criterion we use to establish how much
￿
￿
￿ should be
paidforthereferencesheprovidesis thatofnoriskless prof-
itable arbitrage. The approach followed here was proposed
in [4] for pricing stock options. The idea is as follows. We
assume that
￿
￿ is only interested in the transaction because
her valuation for the good being provided
￿
￿
￿ is higher than
the price
￿ at which the product is offered (i.e.
￿
￿
￿
 
￿ ).
Furthermore, there are only two possible outcomes to the
transaction between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ :
￿ the transaction completes successfully and
￿
￿
￿ pays
￿
dollars and receives a good worth
￿
!
￿ ; or
￿
￿
￿ delivers a product of inferior quality (or does not
deliver) and
￿
￿
￿ loses her payment but gets a product
valued at
"
￿
￿ . 4
This situation is shown in Figure 2(a), where
# and
$ are the
probabilities that the transaction goes well or fails respec-
tively. Figure 2(b) depicts the two possible outcomes of the
4Again,
%
’
& is ultimately trusted so she always pays if the transaction
occurs.transaction between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ that hold when the transac-
tion is insured under TrustDavis. In the model,
￿
￿
￿ pays
(
to obtain a reference from
￿
￿
￿ , where
￿
￿
￿ agrees to pay
￿
￿
the amount
) if the transaction fails. The insurance pre-
mium
( is not recoveredby
￿
￿ after thetransactionis over;
thus, in order to insure herself against a bad transaction,
￿
￿
must be willing to share part of the proceeds that she would
obtain from a successful transaction with the insurer.
We also assume that
￿
￿
￿ can perform riskless borrowing
and lending at an interest rate of
￿
+
*
-
,
￿
￿
/
.
￿
1
0
￿
0 % over the
period of one transaction, under this assumption
2 dollars
before the transaction become
*
2 afterward. We view bor-
rowing and lending money as selling and buying bonds (at
rate
*
). Furthermore, buying goods from
￿
￿ can be seen as
acquiring the rights to get the same goods delivered. The
economicvalue of those rights may uctuate and is only set
once the delivery actually materializes. We can now deter-
mine an upper bound on how much
￿
￿ is willing to pay
￿
￿
￿
for the privilege of receiving a reference that will provide
her with
) dollars if
￿
￿ does not fulll his end of the trans-
action.
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that
￿
￿
￿ can borrow and lend
money at a rate of
*
￿
￿
￿
3
5
4
￿
6 . She wishes to purchase 3
shirts that are on sale at the discount price of $50 dollars
each. She has seen the very same shirts advertised for $100
dollars at a different store and is suspicious that the items
on sale are of inferior quality and in reality are only worth
$25. For a net cost of 30 dollars
￿
￿
￿ can make sure she will
not lose money in the transaction:
1. Instead of buying 3 shirts, she buys 2 and waits to buy
the third later, saving $50.
2. She adds$30ofher ownmoneyandlends the resulting
$80, by buying a bond.
The transaction either succeeds or fails. If the transaction
goes well, the shirts are worth $100 each. She will have
missed the opportunity to buy one shirt at the cheaper price
of $50. However, she will have obtained
￿
￿
3
5
4
￿
6
.
8
7
0
￿
￿
9
0
￿
0
dollars from her loan and she can use the money obtained
to purchasethe remainingshirt as desired (at $100 each). In
this case, she is able to obtain the 3 shirts for the added cost
of $30 which brings her to a total of
:
.
6
￿
0
<
;
=
:
￿
0
￿
￿
7
0
dollars.
If the transaction fails, the shirts are only worth $25 dol-
lars each. She can sell the shirts obtaining
4
.
4
￿
6
￿
6
￿
0 dol-
lars. Adding this sum to the $100 obtained from the loan,
she recoversher original
:
.
6
￿
0
￿
￿
9
6
￿
0 dollars she risked on
the transaction5.
5Ofcourse, shelost the insurance premium of$30,but wecanmodify
the values in the example to incorporate the premium.
We see that $30 is an upper bound on how much
￿
￿
￿
would be willing to pay for references to insure the trans-
action, since for $30, she can insure herself as described.
We view the above example as a situation in which
￿
￿
purchases not only the shirts she wants, but also a hedging
portfolio to insure the transaction. If the transaction fails
the portfolio will pay
) dollars, if it succeeds the portfo-
lio's net worth will be zero. The portfoliopurchased is such
that the sum of both actions  buying the shirts and buy-
ing the portfolio  results in the desired outcome whether
or not the transaction succeeds. If the transaction succeeds
then the goods are obtained for the desired price and if the
transaction fails the portfolio will pay
) dollars.
In the example above,
￿
￿
￿ was willing to pay the amount
of$50foragoodthat,attheendofthetransaction,wouldbe
worth either $100 or $25. Thus, buying goods online from
￿
￿ is verysimilarto buyingsharesin thestockmarketwhere
one cannot predict the future value of those shares. With
this in mind, we need to establish the composition of the
hedging portfolio that will enable us to achieve the desired
outcomes.
Before the transaction, the hedging portfolio is com-
posed of
> shares6 and
￿ bonds. Its value (cost) is
(
￿
>
?
￿
@
;
A
￿ dollars per item (in the example above this
means per shirt). The hedging portfolio insures the transac-
tion by providing
) dollars if the transaction fails and zero
dollars if it succeeds. In other words, after the transaction
the portfolio must be valued at:
￿
(
C
B
￿
0 dollars, if the transaction goes well; or
￿
(
E
D
￿
) dollars, if the transaction fails.
We know that after the transaction each share
￿ will be val-
ued at
￿
!
￿ if the transaction succeeds and
"
￿
￿ if it fails. Sim-
ilarly, all bonds will be valued at
*
￿ . Thus, to nd the
composition of the hedging portfolio we need to solve for
> and
￿ the equations:
>
-
￿
￿
￿
F
;
*
￿
￿
(
B
￿
0
>
?
"
￿
￿
8
;
*
￿
￿
(
D
￿
)
yielding,
>
￿
(
C
B
,
(
D
￿
￿
￿
,
"
￿
￿
,
)
￿
￿
￿
,
"
￿ (1)
￿
￿
￿
!
(
E
D
,
"
￿
(
B
*
G
￿
￿
,
"
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
*
G
￿
￿
,
"
￿ (2)
6We view a share as a consummated purchase that provides the right
to get an item delivered. Thus, if a party has a positive number of shares
it has the right to receive products. On the other hand, if a party has a
negative number of shares it has the obligation to deliver products.v
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dS
uS
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q
p
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v
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without insurance with insurance
Figure 2. The two possible situations a node may face.
Thus, the hedgingportfoliois composedof
> shares and
￿ bonds as described by the equations above and its price
before the transaction is given by
(
￿
>
?
￿
H
;
I
￿ or more
explicitly:
(
￿
)
*
￿
￿
,
J
*
K
￿
￿
￿
,
"
￿ (3)
Examining Equation 3 above provides an intuitive view
of the composition of the cost of insurance in TrustDavis.
The ratio
)
M
L
*
is simply the value of
) , time corrected
to the period before the transaction. The quantities
￿ ,
*
and
" all describe per dollar values. Thus,
￿
￿
,
"
￿
is
the amount risked per dollar in the transaction. Similarly,
￿
￿
,
N
*
￿
￿
L
￿
￿
,
"
￿
is the fraction of the total capital risked that
is abovetheriskless interestrate. See [4, section 3]formore
details. Note also that
> is usually negative meaning that
the purchaser of the portfolio should short sell that amount
in shares7.
In the example above we assumed that if the transaction
falls through the buyer can recover the value
"
￿
￿
￿
P
O
4
￿
6
per item by selling the items after the transaction. Thus,
for
￿
￿
￿ to recover the $50 she spent per shirt,
) need only
be $25 per item. Substituting the values of Example 1 into
equations 1 and 2 we obtain that the hedging portfolio for
one item (i.e. for one shirt) has
>
￿
,
￿
Q
L
￿
: and
￿
￿
7
0
￿
L
K
: .
3.2 Minimizing Risk
Above, we analyzed the situation from the point of view
of the purchaser and obtained an upper bound on the price
of a reference. Now, we look at the same situation from the
point of view of the insurer and establish lower bounds on
the same price.
7In other words, one should acquire the obligation to deliver goods at a
later time. (One pays a negative price for acquiring an obligation.)
In Example1,
￿
￿ providesa reference. Two differentcir-
cumstancesmay arise underwhich
￿
￿ has to decidewhether
or not to provide a reference:
￿ We may have a decision problem where the price
￿
￿
￿ is
willing to pay for a reference of
) dollars is already
xed (say as a percentage of the total transaction). In
this case,
￿
￿
￿ should decide whether or not to provide
such reference.
￿ Alternatively,
￿
￿ may wish to place a bid to provide
such a reference. In this case,
￿
￿ needs to establish a
lower bound so that it does not lose money by bidding
too low and assume too much risk for the reward.
Both of these situations differ from the investment scenario
we considered in 3.1 we assume
￿
￿
￿ has no say in how much
of the money total available for each reference will be used.
We assume
￿
￿
￿ faces a take it or leave it situation in which
the buyer already knows what transactions she wishes to
perform and how many items she wishes to buy, thus the
transactionvalueis xed. Thisextraconstraintenablesus to
nd precise lower bounds on the price and thus to establish
whether providing such a reference is a good proposition
for
￿
￿ .
To begin the analysis let us formulate the problem
￿
￿
faces in the same way we did for
￿
￿
￿ . This is shown in Fig-
ure 3. For each item
￿
￿ decides to insure, he risks
) dollars
of his capital. In exchange, it keeps the insurance premium
( . Thus,
￿
￿
￿ possiblyobtainsa returnof
￿
R
;
T
S
U onhis invest-
ment if the transaction goes well. We assume that
￿
￿
￿ has a
fundwith an initial total of
V
X
W dollars andis also able to es-
timate the probability the transaction may fail
$ . If
￿
￿
￿ risks
too much money in each transaction it insures, then gam-
bler's ruin may occur. We follow the reasoning presented
in [15] to obtain an upper bound on the amount that can bev
1has:
before after
q
p
when providing insurance
K
C
K+C
Figure 3. Insurer's point of view.
risked  or equivalently a lower bound on the price  by
using the Kelly criterion [9].
The Kelly criterion assumes that each transaction can be
repeated indenitely in a sequence of rounds. Denoting by
V
W the initial capital and by
V
J
Y the capital available after
round
Z the Kelly criterion suggests we should maximize
the expected value of the growth rate of capital:
[
￿
￿
]
\
_
^
a
‘
￿
b
F
c
V
Y
V
W
!
d
/
e
f
h
g
We denote by
V
j
i
l
k
￿ the total capital
￿
￿ has available for
insuring a particular transaction at round8
m . Assuming
￿
￿
risks a fraction
n of
V
j
i
l
k
￿ at round
m and the transaction
succeeds we have:
V
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p
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￿
_
;
(
)
r
q
n
!
V
i
+
k
￿
s
;
￿
￿
,
n
￿
V
i
+
k
￿
￿
t
o
￿
_
;
(
)
n
q
V
i
l
k
￿
Similarly, if the transaction fails
￿
￿ gets to keep only the
insurance premium
( . In this case, the wealth after the
transaction is given by:
V
X
i
￿
(
)
n
!
V
j
i
+
k
￿
;
￿
￿
,
n
￿
V
X
i
l
k
￿
￿
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)
n
,
n
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V
j
i
+
k
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Thus,
￿
￿
￿ 's wealth after
Z rounds is given by:
V
Y
￿
V
X
W
N
u
o
￿
_
;
(
)
n
q
/
v
o
￿
￿
;
(
)
,
n
q
/
w
y
x
where
￿
is the numberof times the insured transaction suc-
ceeds(good)and
￿ is thenumberoftimestheinsuredtrans-
action fails (bad). Obviously,
￿
;
z
￿
￿
Z . Calculating the
8If
%
9
{ has a separate sub-fund of total capital
|
-
}
￿
~
{ for each party
%
￿
￿
and is using the strategies describe in section 4 then
%
Q
{ cannot be success-
fully exploited by a malicious party but the overall growth coefcient for
the sum of all sub-funds may be smaller than it would be if the same fund
is used for all parties and defaults are random events. See chapter 15 in
[3].
expected value of the growth rate coefcient we have:
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￿
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Solving the above equation numerically for
[
￿
0 and
differentvalues of
$ yields the minimumvalues for the ratio
S
U shown in the graph of Figure 4.
Note that if
￿
￿
￿ receives a value
( that yields smaller ra-
tios than the ones shown then the growth rate is negative
and gambler's ruin will occur. Alternatively, if the price
(
provides larger returns the insurer's capital will grow at a
rate9
[
.
3.3 Dealing with False Claims
Up to this point we have considered situations where
the party receiving the insurance is considered ultimately
trusted: There were no false claims. We will call this the
no false claims scenario, NFC. Now we take into account
the possibility that the insured party may cheat and stake an
undue claim that the insurer has to pay. Similarly, we call
this the false claims scenario, FC.
The analysis in 3.2 was done in the NFC scenario. We
considereda successful transaction one in which the insurer
kept the money
) and the premium
( . A failed transaction
is one in which the insurer has to pay
) dollars. Because
we made no assumptions about the reasons a transaction
may fail, the same analysis still holds under FC. We only
need to change the probability that the transaction may fail
$ to reect the new risks.
4 Strategies
In this section, we present a strategy for trading online
and providing references that enables an honest individual
to limit how much damage a malicious collusion of players
can do. In all cases, we assume that a potential trader will
9The minimum growth rate desired can be set to a value large than zero
such as the zero risk interest rate. 0
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Figure 4. Minimum cost of a reference as a function of the funds available and the probability of
failure.
only engage in trade if his valuation for the goods being
bought (or sold) is larger than the opportunity cost of the
transaction.
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that
￿
￿ has $190 to spend and
is considering buying a few gifts online. She narrows down
her search to 3 good deals. She can:
1. Buy 3 shirts for$50 each, froman unreliablesource
￿
￿
insuring the transaction for $40. She thinks each shirt
is worth $100.
2. Buy 2 pairs of shoes for $70 each, from a reliable re-
tailer. She thinks each pair is worth $90.
3. Buy 1 game console for $150, also from a reliable on-
line shop. She thinks the console is worth $240.
Assuming that money leftover is not spent, if
￿
￿
￿ chooses
alternative 1 and the transaction goes well, she will have
obtained 3
.
100=300 worth of goods for 3
.
50+40 (in-
surance)=190 dollars. Choosing option 2 she will have
2
.
90+50 (leftover cash)=230 dollars worth (in goods and
cash) for the same 2
.
70+50=190 dollars. Similarly, if
she chooses alternative 3 she will have 240+40 (left-
over cash)=280 dollars worth. Clearly, her best option is
to buy the shirts. We consider the opportunity cost of that
transaction to be the value of the second best option, $280.
In the example above, if the transaction goes well,
￿
￿
￿
obtains an extra 300-280=20 dollars through trading with
￿
￿
￿ that she would not have obtained had
￿
￿
￿ not been avail-
able. Furthermore, because the transaction was insured,
￿
￿
did not risk any money to obtain the extra $2010. Under
these conditions we suggest that to insure herself for future
transactions
￿
￿
￿ should save $5 of the $20 obtained in a fund
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
that will provide references to
￿
￿ . In doing so,
￿
￿
￿
is extending
￿
￿ a credit line  a fairly common business
practice.
4.1 A Strategy When There Are No False Claims
We can now describe a non-exploitablestrategy for trad-
ing and providing references online. We rst consider the
NFC scenario. Toavoidexploitation
￿
￿ proceedsas follows:
1. During the initialization step,
￿
￿
￿ only provides refer-
ences to agents she trusts and that will not default on
their obligations. She can also provide references to
agents that leave a security deposit under her control.
2.
￿
￿
￿ only engages in insured transactions by obtaining
references for them through the individuals she trusts.
3. After every transaction (buy or sell)
￿
￿
￿ saves part of
the gains obtained in excess of the opportunity cost in
separate funds that are linked to each trade partner (to
10We assume the insurance was such that she would also receive $280
dollars if the transaction failed. A similar argument can be made if
%
s
&
receives $190 in insurance in case the transaction fails, but can still buy the
console after receiving the insurance money.provide references for them). This helps her to insure
future transactions with each partner.
4.
￿
￿ provides referencesto others by chargingpremiums
as described in section 3.2. This provides some con-
dence that the money saved will grow at an specied
rate. Again, each premium received is put in a sepa-
rate fund that is linked to the agent it insured against
bad behavior of (not the agent who paid for it).
Because
￿
￿ only engages in insured transactions, this strat-
egy limits
￿
￿ 's exposure to the total amount in the funds
￿
￿
￿
￿
i
￿
for all
￿
i she is willing to provide a reference for.
This value,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
i
￿
￿
￿
￿
i
￿
, is only changed by adding
money earned through trading in excess of the opportunity
cost or through selling references. In either case, the funds
have been obtained through the trading in TrustDavis and
from the parties they may benet.
4.2 An Alternative Algorithm for Obtaining Ref­
erences
In the NFC scenario, all references are directly obtained
by the party being insured,
￿
￿
￿ . Thus, intermediate nodes
will pay insurance, in the event of a failed transaction, di-
rectly to the insured party. In this scenario, the insured
party
￿
￿
￿ is the same for all intermediate nodes. Interme-
diate nodes also provide insurance against bad behavior of
other intermediate nodes. Thus, the party being insured,
￿
￿
￿ ,
insures a transaction by walking the paths from itself to the
party they wish to trade with,
￿
￿
￿ , as described in section
3. We assume some efcient distributed algorithm is used
to nd such paths. This procedure makes price negotiation
easy as all communicationoccurs between the agent asking
for the references and the agents providing references with
no intermediaries.
In the FC scenario, the above algorithm cannot be used
because some insurers may no longer trust the party asking
for the reference. We change the algorithm, described in
section 3, as follows: when
￿
￿
￿ wants to make a purchase
from
￿
￿ she only asks her neighboringnodes to provide ref-
erences for the transaction. Her neighbors, in turn, ask for
references on their own behalf from their neighbors along a
path from themselves to
￿
￿
￿ . Once those references are es-
tablished and
￿
￿
￿ is reached, the replies propagate back to
￿
￿ . In Figure 1 this corresponds to the following sequence
of requests and replies:
1.
￿
￿
￿ asks
￿
￿ for a reference valued at $150 against bad
behavior of
￿
￿ and waits for a reply.
2.
￿
￿
￿ asks
￿
￿
￿ for a reference valued at $50 against bad
behavior of
￿
￿
￿ and waits for a reply.
3.
￿
￿ veries that he trusts both
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ more than
$50 and replies to
￿
￿ providing the reference.
4.
￿
￿ veries that he has at least $150 dollars of ow
capacity to both
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ and replies to
￿
￿
￿ providing
a reference.
5.
￿
￿
￿ goes ahead with the transaction.
Note that by using this algorithm the beneciaries of the
referencesprovidedarealways neighboringnodesandmore
complicated price negotiation is required, because the party
payingfortheinsuranceisnotindirectcommunicationwith
the insurers.
4.3 A Non­Exploitable Strategy
Let us call a partyagainstwhose misbehaviora reference
is provided the object party. Also, let us call the party that
receives money if a transaction fails the insured party. The
party providing the reference is the insurer.
Consider applying the strategy described in section 4.1
above to the example in Figure 1, using the algorithm de-
scribed in section 3 in the NFC scenario. When
￿
￿
￿ provides
a reference to
￿
￿ against bad behavior of
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿ limits his li-
ability to the capacity of the edge from
￿
￿
￿ to
￿
￿
￿ , i.e. $100.
Similarly,
￿
￿
￿ is also asked toprovidea referenceagainstbad
behavior of
￿
￿
￿ and he also limits his liability to the capac-
ity of the edge from
￿
￿ to
￿
￿ , $50. So
￿
￿ 's total liability for
the transaction is $150.
In the FC scenario, the outcome of the transaction no
longer relies only on the trustworthiness of
￿
￿ , it also de-
pends on
￿
￿
￿ . If
￿
￿ provides references to
￿
￿
￿ with a total
value that is smaller than the total network ow capacity
from
￿
￿ to
￿
￿
￿ 11, then
￿
￿ can recover potential losses caused
by
￿
￿
￿ by withdrawingmoneyfromthe appropriatefunds. In
the example, this is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. Before doing so,
￿
￿ must per-
form due diligence and establish that the transaction failed
due to
￿
￿
￿ and not
￿
￿ . If the transaction fails due to
￿
￿ , then
￿
￿
￿ can only recover $100 from his own funds. Thus, if
￿
G
￿
is to provide the same total liability of $150 he should ob-
tain from
￿
￿
￿ a reference for himself against bad behavior of
￿
￿
￿ . By obtaining this reference from
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿ simply limits
his liability to the smallest of the two ows
￿
￿
￿ to
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ to
￿
￿
￿ . This is the strategy we propose should be used. It
requires the algorithm described in section 4.2.
In the FC scenario,when an insurerprovidesa reference,
that reference will be unclaimed only if both the insured
and the object party behave appropriately. Therefore, it is
toorestrictivetodepositthepremiumreceivedforproviding
this reference in a fund linked exclusively to the name of
the object party as in the NFC scenario. This is because
11Note that the total network ow capacity from
%
K
{ to
%
& in Figure 1
is $300 but each path can only be used once in the following discussion.
Thus, we only consider the edge
￿
￿
%
Q
{
’
￿
￿
%
’
&
￿
￿ as a return path to
%
￿
& , since
￿
a
%
9
{
’
￿
￿
%
’
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
%
9
{
’
￿
￿
%
￿
￿
’
￿ are already being used in the forward direction to
link to
%
’
￿ .the insurer cannotbe exploited by linking this fundto either
party and linking it to only one party unnecessarily limits
the numberof transactions the insurer can be involvedin. A
more exible approach is to have yet another fund that can
be used to provide references to either party.
In summary,to adapt the strategyproposedin section 4.1
totheFC scenarioparticipantsneedtoperformthreeactions
differently:
￿ As described in section 4.2, the insurer must acquire
insurance (by obtaining references from his neigh-
bors) when asked to insure a transaction ow that
is greater than his direct capacity to insure, as mea-
sured by the capacity of the edge from him to the ob-
ject party.
￿ When providingreferences, the insurer has to limit his
liability to the minimum of the two ows
1. from the insurer to the insured party;
2. from the insurer to the object party.
￿ Link money received through selling references not
only to the object party but to the pair (insured party,
object party).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a reputation system with the
following four important properties:
￿ Honest participants can limit the damage caused by
malicious collusions of dishonest participants.
￿ Malicious participants gain no signicant advantage
by changing or issuing themselves multiple identities.
￿ Thereis strongincentiveforparticipantsto provideac-
curate ratings of each other.
￿ It requires no centralized services, and thus can be eas-
ily distributed.
We think interesting directions for future research are to ex-
plicitly address issues that may arise within the framework
due to the time varying value of money and to analyze pro-
tocols for price negotiation and nding paths distributively.
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